Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 16 | Issue 2

Article 4

2009

The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review
Tribunals and the Struggle to Balance National
Security and Constitutional Values During the War
on Terror
Doran G. Arik

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Doran G. Arik, The Tug of War: Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the Struggle to Balance National Security and Constitutional
Values During the War on Terror, 16 J. L. & Pol'y (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol16/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

THE TUG OF WAR: COMBATANT STATUS
REVIEW TRIBUNALS AND THE STRUGGLE
TO BALANCE NATIONAL SECURITY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES DURING THE
WAR ON TERROR
Doran G. Arik*
There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and
justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic
excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude of those who
wield the physical resources of the community. Such
principles were made by no human hands; indeed, if they
did not antedate deity itself, they will so express its nature
as to bind and control it. They are external to all Will as
such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They are eternal
and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws
are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters
indifferent, merely a record or transcript, and their
enactment an act not of will or power but one of discovery
and declaration.1

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Georgetown University,
2004. The author wishes to thank her mom for providing unending
encouragement and editing assistance, and Becky Wasserman for keeping her
company in the library all year. She would also like to express her gratitude to
Professors Jason Mazzone and Aliza Kaplan for providing conceptual guidance
during the writing process, as well as the members of the Journal of Law and
Policy for all their hard work.
1
Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American
Constitutional Law, in T HE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 67, 70 (Randy
E. Barnett ed., 1989) (internal italics omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
The three branches of the American government have been
wrangling over the rights of non-citizen detainees held at the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba2 ever since the government
began sending suspected terrorists there in 2002.3 Times of war
often give rise to internal struggles within government as the
nation’s leadership attempts to maintain a delicate balance between
the equally important yet competing interests of defending national
security and individual liberty. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 unquestionably placed new and different pressures on the
American government; an attack on American soil heightened the
government’s responsibility to preserve and protect the nation.
National defense and individual liberty are not mutually exclusive
interests, however, and unfortunately the American government
has thus far been unable to strike the appropriate balance between
the two initiatives. The result is perhaps best described as a sixyear tug-of-war between Congress and the Executive on the one
hand and the Supreme Court on the other.
Almost immediately after the United States brought the first
suspected terrorists to Guantanamo in January of 2002,4 detainees
2

See Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba,
W ASH . POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at A10.
3
On several occasions, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to seek a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court challenging the legality of one’s detention
extends to Guantanamo detainees, while Congress, under political pressure from
both its own members and the Administration, effectively legislated to overturn
those decisions. After the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004), that non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo have the right to petition
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress
passed the Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) which stripped federal courts of
their jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text. Then, after the Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), that the DTA did not apply to habeas petitions already
pending when the DTA was enacted, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (“MCA”) which explicitly and effectively stripped federal
courts of any and all jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions. See infra text
accompanying notes 53–54.
4
Vogel, supra note 2.
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began petitioning federal courts for writs of habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of their detentions on both constitutional and
statutory grounds.5 However, each time the Supreme Court held
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, commonly referred to as the habeas statute,
extended to alien detainees held at Guantanamo,6 Congress
responded with legislation to strip federal courts of their
jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions. 7 Without access to
federal courts through habeas petitions, each detainee must instead
rely on the limited review process that accompanies his individual
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”)—a process hastily
created by the Department of Defense (“DOD”) in 2004 to review
detainees’ enemy combatant status designations. Under the
Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) and Military Commissions Act
(“MCA”), a detainee at Guantanamo may only seek review in the
D.C. Circuit Court as to whether the CSRT in his case properly

5

See generally Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)
(holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by
aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States), aff’d by AlOdah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d, Rasul, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that Guantanamo detainees have the right to file
habeas petitions in federal court to challenge the legality of their detentions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
6
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 (holding that detainees at Guantanamo have
the right to petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus under the habeas
statute for a review of the legality of their detentions); see also Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. at 2769 (concluding that restrictions imposed on detainees’ right to file
petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal court by Congress in the DTA did
not apply to cases already pending when the DTA was passed).
7
Congress first attempted to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over
detainees’ habeas petitions in the wake of Rasul when it passed the DTA in
2005. See Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,
Title X, Matters Relating to Detainees, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005) [hereinafter Detainee Treatment Act]. Then in 2006 the Supreme Court
ruled in Hamdan that the DTA did not apply to cases already pending when the
law was enacted. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749. In response, Congress passed
the MCA, effectively and completely withdrawing detainees’ right to file habeas
petitions in federal court. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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followed DOD standards and procedures.8 This limited review
prevents any examination of the underlying legitimacy of CSRT
procedures, despite the fact that the process denies detainees
bedrock procedural guarantees at the core of the American legal
system.9
In stripping federal courts of their jurisdiction over detainees’
habeas petitions, the Administration strenuously maintains, and
Congress has thus far seemingly agreed, that because Guantanamo
detainees are non-citizens captured and detained abroad, U.S.
constitutional rights do not extend to them.10 Such an argument
presupposes that constitutional rights exist in a vacuum, and fails
to take into account both the core principles underlying
constitutional guarantees and the historical purpose for their
inclusion in the Constitution.
The Framers recognized certain rights as deriving from natural
law, and intended the Constitution to serve as the protector, not the
8

“ The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit . . . shall be limited to the consideration of—whether the
status determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with regard to
such alien was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the
Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals . . . .” Detainee
Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2)(C). The MCA left this portion of the DTA
unchanged when it was subsequently enacted in 2006. See Military
Commissions Act.
9
Judge Joyce Green of the D.C. District Court, before whom many
detainees have appeared after filing petitions, lamented in her disposition of one
group of consolidated cases that, “CSRTs are unconstitutional for failing to
comport with the requirements of due process.” In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. and reh’g granted, 127 S. Ct.
3078 (2007).
10
See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990–91; see generally Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). This Note does not examine whether specific
constitutional rights as such should extend to detainees held at Guantanamo.
Rather, the discussion here is limited to an examination of the degree to which
natural law and founding principles require that a minimum procedural standard
be met in order to preserve fundamental constitutional values. The analysis
undertaken here does not imply an assumption of the constitutionality, or
unconstitutionality, of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA and
MCA.
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creator, of those rights.11 Indeed, the liberty rights as recognized by
the Framers did not originate in the Constitution, but rather were
deemed natural rights that predated its ratification.12 More than
simply conferring certain rights on American citizens, the
constitutional guarantees of due process and habeas corpus serve to
“preserve unimpaired the . . . safeguards of civil liberty.”13
Because protecting against “interferences with the individual’s
right to liberty is . . . one of the fundamental principles of a
democratic society,”14 such a goal cannot be limited to citizens.
Unchecked attempts to curtail individual liberty—regardless of
citizenry—will irreparably undermine our democratic foundations.
Preserving safeguards of civil liberties thus must be a universal
imperative.
This Note argues that the CSRT process cobbled together by
the DOD undermines the fundamental tenet of individual liberty,
which sits at the core of the American legal system. Part I of this
Note provides the history of detention at Guantanamo and
examines detainees’ challenges to their detentions coupled with the
varying responses by Congress and the courts. Part II examines the
natural law principles that underlie specific guarantees provided in
the Constitution and the degree to which such principles lend
legitimacy to the American legal system. Part III presents a more
detailed examination of the CSRT system and analyzes how the
inherent problems therein undermine the role of natural law
11

See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What
it Says, 85 TEX . L. REV . 1 (2006) [hereinafter The Ninth Amendment] (arguing
that “individual natural rights existed prior to the Bill of Rights”); see also
RANDY E. B ARNETT, R ESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
12
See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074–80 (1991) (arguing that the
Framers of the American Constitution shared a strong belief in natural rights,
including but not limited to the right to liberty, and understood natural rights to
“come from God rather than the government”).
13
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2772 (2006) (quoting Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)).
14
Brief of Amici Curiae Specialists in Israeli Military Law and
Constitutional Law in Support of Petitioners at 10, Boumediene v. Bush, No.
06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter
Brief of Specialists in Israeli Military Law].
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principles in the American constitutional system. Finally, Part IV
provides a survey of recent and pending developments, arguing
that the most effective method for remedying the problems with
the current process for examining detainees’ detention, and by
extension for striking an appropriate balance between preserving
core American principles and protecting our national security
interests, lies in congressional action that respects Supreme Court
mandates.
I. T HE HISTORY OF DETENTION AT G UANTANAMO—A
TIMELINE
A. Arrival and Detention
Within one week of September 11, 2001,15 Congress passed a
joint resolution authorizing the President to use “all necessary and
appropriate force . . . to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States.”16 Shortly after U.S. troops

15

On Sept. 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four planes, crashing two aircraft
into the Twin Towers in New York City, and another into the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. See Mitchell Zuckoff & Matthew Brelis, Thousands Feared
Dead After Planes Hit Towers, Pentagon, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 2001, at
A1.
16
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, P.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001). The Authorization for the Use of Military Force, a joint resolution
of Congress, granted the specific statutory authorization that the President
needed, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, in order to initiate military
action first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The 93rd Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution in 1973 to “insure that the collective judgment of both
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
[military] into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” War Powers Resolution,
Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). Section 8(a) of the resolution vests
authority to introduce American troops into hostilities only pursuant to specific
statutory authorization. Id. See also George W. Bush, President of the U.S.,
The White House, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110078.html [hereinafter Presidential Address to the Nation].
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initiated the first strike in Afghanistan,17 President Bush issued a
military order giving the Secretary of Defense detention and trial
authority over individuals captured by the United States and
outlining minimum provisional and procedural guarantees for
detainees.18
In January of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
announced that the military was “making preparations” to send
detainees to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.19 One
week later, the first of several hundred detainees arrived there.20
Though the President’s Military Order authorized Secretary
Rumsfeld to regulate detainees’ trials,21 Secretary Rumsfeld made
clear at that time that there were “no plans to hold any kind of
tribunal [in Guantanamo].”22

17

On October 7, 2001 the United States military began strikes, pursuant to
President Bush’s order, “against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military
installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.” Presidential Address to the
Nation, supra note 16.
18
For example, the order mandated that detainees be treated humanely, be
afforded adequate food and water, and be allowed to practice their religion freely.
In addition, the order provided that detainees were to be given a “full and fair
trial” subject to the “rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military
commissions.” Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the U.S., The
White House, President Issues Military Order: Detention, Treatment and Trial
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/2001111327.html [hereinafter President’s Military Order].
19
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD News Briefing
(Dec. 27, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=2696 [hereinafter DOD Briefing].
20
See Vogel, supra note 2.
21
The President’s Military Order authorized the Secretary of Defense to
appoint military commissions and issue any other orders and regulations
deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the Order. See President’s
Military Order, supra note 18.
22
DOD Briefing, supra note 19.
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B. Initial Challenges

Almost immediately after terrorism suspects arrived at
Guantanamo, detainees began to seek judicial review of their
detentions by filing habeas petitions in federal court.23 Detainees
argued that they did not fight against the United States, that they
were never “supporter[s] of the Taliban or any terrorist
organization,” and that their detentions were therefore unlawful.24
In response, the government argued that U.S. courts lacked
jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions brought by non-citizens
captured and detained abroad.25 The D.C. District Court agreed,
and granted the government’s motion to dismiss the detainees’
petitions.26
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the District Court’s
decision to grant the government’s motion to dismiss.27 However,
in 2004 the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower
courts, holding in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. courts do have
23

For example, petitioners in Rasul v. Bush first filed their habeas petition
in D.C. District Court on February 19, 2002. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d
55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002). The action before the District Court was a consolidation
of two cases, Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States. Later appeals in that
action to the D.C. Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court are
referenced by varying captions, including both Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v.
United States.
24
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
25
Id. at 56.
26
Id. at 57. The District Court looked to earlier precedent, and held that
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), was controlling. In Johnson, the
Supreme Court dismissed habeas petitions filed by German nationals captured
and tried in China during World War II and subsequently detained at a military
prison in Germany. See id. In dismissing their habeas petitions for lack of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the writ of habeas corpus did not
extend to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Id. at
778. The District Court in Rasul held that, like in Johnson, the writ of habeas
corpus did not extend to detainees held at Guantanamo because Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba is “outside the sovereign territory of the United States,” and thus the
Court lacked jurisdiction. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72–73.
27
Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(on appeal from Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55).
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jurisdiction under the habeas statute to consider challenges to the
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and
detained at Guantanamo.28 That same day, in another similar case, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that Congress’ Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) provided the necessary
authorization to detain, but that detainees must be afforded the
opportunity to appeal an enemy combatant status determination.29
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul affirming
detainees’ right to challenge the legality of their detention by filing
habeas petitions, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
issued a memorandum establishing CSRTs and outlining the
procedures required therein.30 Specifically, CSRT proceedings were
to operate under the presumption that each detainee was an enemy
combatant.31 CSRTs were billed as an opportunity for a detainee to

28

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). In practice, the Supreme
Court’s disposition in Rasul meant that detainees’ petitions for habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia could no longer be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
29
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004). Hamdi involved a
habeas petition brought by a United States citizen who was captured in
Afghanistan, classified as an enemy combatant and detained at a navy brig in
South Carolina. See id. In Hamdi the Court was confronted with whether a
United States citizen could be detained as an enemy combatant without being
formally charged. Id. at 509. A plurality of Justices held that while a citizen
could be detained, due process requires that he be given a “meaningful
opportunity” to contest the factual basis of his detention. See id. Though the
case dealt with the rights of a detained U.S. citizen, the applicability of this case
lies in the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF passed by Congress in 2001
did in fact authorize the United States government to hold detainees without
charging them. Id.
30
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of
Def. on Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the Sec’y of
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memorandum].
31
The Wolfowitz Memorandum defines the term “enemy combatant” as
“an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” See id.
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challenge that determination.32 Pursuant to the Wolfowitz
Memorandum, panels of commissioned military officers were
directed to review each detainee’s enemy combatant status
designation based upon a record prepared by a designated
“Recorder,” which consisted of “reasonably available information
generated in connection with the initial determination to hold the
detainee as an enemy combatant . . . as well as any reasonably
available records, determinations, or reports generated in
connection therewith.”33 The memorandum provided that detainees
were permitted to attend proceedings accompanied by an
interpreter and a “Personal Representative,”34 and to call
“reasonably available” witnesses. 35
CSRT panels are not bound by traditional rules of evidence, but
rather may consider “any information it deems relevant and helpful
. . . [and] may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the
reliability of such evidence in the circumstances.”36 In determining
whether detainees were properly designated as enemy combatants,
CSRT panels were directed to base their decisions on the
“preponderance of the evidence,” with the caveat that the panel

32

The Wolfowitz Memorandum outlined various procedures that would
govern CSRT review of a detainee’s enemy combatant status determination, and
provided, amongst other things, that detainees would be given an “opportunity
to contest designation as an enemy combatant . . . [and to] consult with and be
assisted by a personal representative.” Id.
33
Id.
34
See Id. The “Personal Representative” was authorized to assist the
detainee in his CSRT. Implementing guidelines issued by the Secretary of the
Navy clarified that the Personal Representative was not to serve as an advocate
for the detainee but rather his role was merely to explain the nature of the
proceedings. Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, U.S.
Dep’t of Def. on Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba
(July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040730comb.pdf [hereinafter England Memorandum].
35
The CSRT panel has the authority, pursuant to the Wolfowitz
Memorandum, to determine the “reasonable availability” of witnesses, and
provides that written statements may be substituted if a witness is deemed not
reasonably available. See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30.
36
Id.
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would accord the government’s evidence presented against a
detainee a presumption of validity. 37 Although the Wolfowitz
Memorandum explicitly preserved detainees’ right to petition U.S.
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus,38 the government would
later contest that right in subsequent litigation.39
In the months following the Rasul decision, detainees filed
numerous habeas petitions in federal court,40 many but not all of
which were consolidated in D.C. District Court to facilitate
proceedings.41 While these consolidations were meant to create a
smoother, more uniform process, in reality there were huge
inconsistencies in the way district court judges interpreted
detainees’ rights in the different groups of cases. 42 For example, in
37

Id.
Id. In fact, detainees were reportedly advised on three separate occasions
of their right to seek writs of habeas corpus in federal court. Mark Denbeaux &
Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings—CSRT: The Modern Habeas
Corpus? 12 Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 951245 (2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951245.
39
See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also Boumediene
v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. argued
Dec. 5, 2007).
40
Many of these petitions have since become well known, including those
filed on behalf of Jose Padilla and Salim Hamdan. Individual petitions were
often filed by “next friends” on behalf of many detainees. Though “next friend”
status at times posed problems of standing, Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp. 2d
91 (D.D.C. 2004), such a standing discussion is outside the scope of this Note.
41
After the Supreme Court held in Rasul that proper jurisdiction for
detainees’ habeas petitions lay in the District Court in Washington, D.C., the
government filed a motion to coordinate detainees’ numerous pending petitions.
In August of 2004, the Calendar and Case Management Committee for the D.C.
District Court designated Judge Joyce Green to “coordinate and manage all
proceedings in these matters [of Guantanamo detainees] and to the extent
necessary rule on common procedural and substantive issues.” Gherebi, 338 F.
Supp. 2d at 94. The Committee’s order was affirmed by an Executive Session of
the D.C. District Court on September 14, 2004. Id. Judge Leon of the D.C.
District Court, however, chose not to transfer the pending cases on his docket.
As such, he retained the cases collectively known as Boumediene v. Bush,
currently pending before the Supreme Court. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,
355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 n.14 (D.D.C. 2005).
42
Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting
the government’s motion to dismiss detainees’ habeas petitions because
38
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one group of cases Judge Richard Leon of the D.C. District Court
granted the government’s motion to dismiss the petitions on the
ground that there “was no viable legal theory under which a federal
court could issue a writ of habeas corpus”43 even though detainees
technically had the right to petition the court for such writs. Judge
Leon reasoned that irrespective of detainees’ rights to petition a
court for a writ of habeas corpus, they had no legally enforceable
constitutional rights on which a federal court could actually issue a
writ. In contrast, only one week later in another group of
consolidated cases,44 Judge Joyce Green of the D.C. District Court
denied similar motions to dismiss filed by the government, finding
that “Guantanamo detainees are entitled to due process under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”45
C. Congressional Response
Congress swiftly responded to the wave of petitions filed by
detainees. Following the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the
right of Guantanamo detainees to petition federal courts for writs
of habeas corpus, Congress amended the habeas statute.46 The

detainees had no substantive constitutional rights on which the court could issue
a writ), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C.
2005) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss detainees’ habeas petitions
because the D.C. District Court was the appropriate forum for their resolution).
43
Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
44
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
45
Id. at 465. After Judge Green denied the government’s motion to
dismiss, the government filed a motion for a protective order to prevent
disclosure of certain information to detainees and their counsel, and further limit
contact between detainees and their counsel. The D.C. District Court ultimately
issued a protective order that laid out the scope of attorney-client contact and the
extent to which the government was entitled to restrict access to classified
documents. The Green Protective Order, named for Judge Green who authored
the opinion, was largely followed until its scope was challenged two years later
in Bismullah v. Gates. See Bismullah v. Gates (Bismullah I), 501 F.3d 178
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
46
Section 1005(e)(1) of the DTA expressly amends the habeas statute to
strip federal courts of their jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by detainees at
Guantanamo. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
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DTA, which was signed into law by President Bush on December
30, 2005, prevented any United States court from exercising
jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by
detainees held at Guantanamo.47 As an alternative, the DTA

(2005).
47

Detainee Treatment Act § 1005. Congress enacted the DTA as part of an
emergency supplemental appropriations package to the fiscal year 2006
Department of Defense appropriations bill. Relevant portions of the DTA are
found in Section 1005:
(e) Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 2241 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider—
“(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
“(2) any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of
Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who—
“(A) is currently in military custody; or
“(B) has been determined by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance
with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant.”.
(2) REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNALS OF PROPRIETY OF DETENTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraphs (B), (C), and
(D), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an
enemy combatant.
(B) LIMITATION ON CLAIMS.—The jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit under this paragraph shall be limited to claims brought
by or on behalf of an alien—
(i) who is, at the time a request for review by such
court is filed, detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and
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allowed for judicial review of CSRT determinations exclusively in
the D.C. Circuit Court.48 The legislative history of the DTA makes
clear that Congress’ goal was to deny detainees at Guantanamo any
rights to petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus, thereby
negating the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul.49
The Supreme Court, however, balked at Congress’ move to
eliminate its jurisdiction. Six months after the DTA was signed into
law, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld50 that the DTA “did
not strip federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases pending on the date
of the DTA’s enactment.”51 The Court gave import to the fact that
no provision of the DTA explicitly applied to pending cases,
noting that Congress “chose not to so provide—after being
(ii) for whom a Combatant Status Review Tribunal
has been conducted, pursuant to applicable procedures
specified by the Secretary of Defense.
(C) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—The jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph
shall be limited to the consideration of—
(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was
consistent with the standards and procedures specified by
the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion
of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the Government’s evidence); and
(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United
States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and
procedures to make the determination is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Detainee Treatment Act § 1005.
48
Detainee Treatment Act § 1005.
49
Senator Lindsey Graham’s statement during the Senate’s consideration of
the National Defense Authorization Conference Report, of which the DTA was a
part, is just one example of similar statements indicating Congress’ intent to
expressly respond to the Rasul decision. 151 CONG . R. S14256 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (“Since the Rasul decision was based on
the habeas statute in the U.S. Code, I am very comfortable amending that statute
as a proper congressional response to the Court’s decision.”).
50
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
51
Id. at 2769 n.15 (emphasis added).
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presented with the option—for [a provision to deal with pending
cases] . . . [and that] omission is an integral part of the statutory
scheme.”52 In effect, the Court’s decision invalidated any habeas
corpus petition that was pending when the DTA was enacted.
The struggle between Congress and the Court continued.
Congress responded to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan that the DTA
did not apply to pending cases by passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.53 The legislation again amended the
habeas statute, this time explicitly stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction over any and all habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo
detainees, and again limiting the scope of review to CSRT
procedures.54 Congress spoke directly to the Court’s decision in
52

Id. at 2769.
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006). As Judge Randolph of the D.C. Circuit Court notably pointed out,
“one of the primary purposes of the MCA was to overrule Hamdan.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
54
Military Commissions Act §7(a). The stated purpose of the
comprehensive law was “to authorize trial by military commission for
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.” §7(a). When President
Bush signed the MCA into law, he called it “one of the most important pieces
of legislation in the war on terror.” Press Release, George W. Bush, President of
the United States, The White House, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html.
President Bush also described the law as providing “a way to deliver
justice to the terrorists we have captured . . . [with] a fair trial, in which the
accused are presumed innocent, have access to an attorney, and can hear all the
evidence against them. These military commissions are lawful, they are fair, and
they are necessary.” Id. President Bush’s description is accurate only insofar as
it describes the military commissions authorized by the law, but his statement
should not be read to encompass the provisions of the MCA that strip federal
courts of their jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo detainees’ habeas petitions or
those that codify CSRTs and the D.C. Circuit’s appellate review authority.
The relevant portion of the MCA is found in Section 7, entitled Habeas
Corpus Matters:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
is amended by striking both the subsection (e) added by section
1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109–148 (119 Stat. 2742) and the subsection (e) added by added by section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law
109–163 (119 Stat. 3477) and inserting the following new subsection
53
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Hamdan with Section 7(b), which explicitly dealt with pending
cases and stated that the amendment to the habeas statute “shall
apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act.”55 The plain language of the statute
foreclosed any further arguments that pending cases fell outside the
scope of the legislation.56 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit Court
was left with the limited power to review only whether a CSRT
complied with its own procedures.57

(e):
“(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who
has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
“(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801
note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial,
or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained
by the United States and has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination.”.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and
shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention
of an alien detained by the United States since September 11,
2001.
Military Commissions Act § 7.
55
Military Commissions Act § 7 (emphasis added).
56
The Congressional Record reveals numerous statements making clear
that, “[w]ithout exception, both the proponents and opponents of section 7 [of
the MCA] understood the provision to eliminate habeas jurisdiction over
pending cases.” Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(internal citations omitted), cert and reh’g granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29,
2007).
57
The Court was thus limited under the DTA and MCA to a narrow
review of the procedures afforded to detainees during the D.C. Circuit’s
examination on appeal of an individual CSRT proceeding, rather than a broader
analysis of the processes detainees should be afforded during the underlying
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While Congress attempted to act with sufficient intent to quell
future challenges, the struggle continued. In 2006, a group of
detainees58 invoked the limited statutory review permitted by the

CSRT process itself.
58
One group of detainees, petitioners in Parhat v. Gates, are seven
Uighursa Muslim ethnic minority from western China subject to religious
and political persecution by the Communist regime. See U.S. DEP’ T OF STATE ,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON H UMAN R IGHTS PRACTICES—2004—CHINA (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm.
According to the State Department, the “[Chinese] Government used the
international war on terror as a pretext for cracking down harshly on suspected
Uighur separatists expressing peaceful political dissent.” Id. Petitioners fled
persecution to an Uighur expatriate village in the mountains of Afghanistan near
the Pakistan border. Petition for Immediate Release and Other Relief Under
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and, in the Alternative, for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 13–14, Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-1397 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Petition for Release]. After the village was bombed in October,
2001, the Uighurs crossed into Pakistan and were taken in by local villagers
who later turned them over to the U.S. military, along with the other Uighurs
in the village, in exchange for a $5,000 bounty per Uighur. Id. at 15.
Despite public exculpatory statements made on behalf of the Parhat
petitioners, including a United States Ambassador and a colonel in the United
States military, CSRT panels found that each was properly designated an enemy
combatant. Respondents’ Joint Opposition to the Application for a Stay of the
Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Until 14
Days After Disposition of this Case and Consent to the Motion for Expedited
Consideration of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and for Expedited Merits
Briefing and Oral Argument in the Event that the Court Grants the Petition at
8–9, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07A-677 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief]. The eighth petitioner, Haji Bismullah, is
an Afghan national who fled Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1996 when the Taliban
came to power. Id. at 5. Bismullah returned to Afghanistan along with his
brothers after Hamid Karzai came to power to “help U.S. and coalition forces
defeat the Taliban,” and was later appointed as a transportation minister under
Karzai’s government. Id. at 5–6. American forces mistakenly arrested him in
2003, and “despite assurances of his innocence from the Afghan government, the
military transferred Bismullah to Bagram Air Base and then Guantanamo” where
a CSRT found he was properly designated as an enemy combatant. Conference
Call: Another Detainee Case Heads to High Court, Courtwatch—Justices
Asked to Take Case of Prisoners Seeking Evidence Government Used to Declare
Them ‘Enemy Combatants’, LEGAL T IMES, March 10, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter
Conference Call].

674

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

DTA and MCA to challenge their CSRTs and enemy combatant
status designations in the D.C. Circuit Court. 59 After months of
briefing, largely regarding the scope and type of evidence the court
may consider in conducting its review, a unanimous panel of the
D.C. Circuit dealt a blow to the government by ruling that it must
provide to the reviewing court all the information “reasonably
available” to the government relevant to a detainee, as opposed to
the smaller subset of evidence presented at his CSRT as the
government had urged.60 Although the government subsequently
sought a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court’s ruling imposed
too substantial a burden and would endanger national security, the
D.C. Circuit Court declined to rehear the case in February 2008.61
In the meantime, another group of detainees mounted a
challenge to the court-stripping provision of the DTA and MCA
itself. In December 2007, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in the companion cases Boumediene v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United
States,62 wherein petitioner detainees argued that they are entitled
to habeas rights under the United States Constitution, and that the
CSRT process along with judicial review in the D.C. Circuit is not
an adequate and effective alternative.63 The government, in
contrast, maintained that the right to petition a federal court for a
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to non-citizen detainees at
Guantanamo and that the procedures afforded by the DTA and
MCA are more than adequate.64
Boumediene’s pendency in the Supreme Court afforded the

59

Petitioner in Bismullah v. Gates filed an appeal from his Combatant
Status Review Tribunal on June 9, 2006. Petitioners in Parhat v. Gates filed
their own appeals on December 4, 2006. After considerable motion practice, the
D.C. Circuit ordered that the two groups of cases be set for oral argument on the
same day before the same panel. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
60
See id.
61
Bismullah v. Gates (Bismullah III), 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
62
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 061196 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2007).
63
Conference Call, supra note 58.
64
Transcript of Oral Arguments, Boumediene, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah, No.
06-1196 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2007).
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government another angle in Bismullah after its petition for a
rehearing en banc was denied. In February 2008, the government
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that
until the Court decides the merits of the Boumediene case the
government should not have to undertake the burdensome task of
either compiling voluminous records as required by the D.C.
Circuit’s July 2007 ruling or, instead, act on the court’s alternative
suggestion of reconvening new CSRTs.65 As such, the government
requested that the Supreme Court stay the D.C. Circuit’s judgment
and hold the petition for certiorari in Bismullah until it renders a
decision in Boumediene, or, alternatively, that the Court grant the
petition for certiorari and set Bismullah on an expedited schedule
so that the two cases may be decided together this term.66 For their
part, detainees argued in a reply brief that the government’s
petition to the Supreme Court is merely a veiled attempt to delay
detainees’ cases brought under the DTA, and that a stay would
“harm the interests of justice and serve no legitimate purpose.”67
Although the Court was expected to consider the appeal at its
private conference on March 14, 2008,68 no action has yet been
taken.
II. F UNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, N ATURAL LAW AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
Constitutional ratification debates and Supreme Court
jurisprudence provide the background by which to understand the
need to provide Guantanamo detainees with procedures that
adequately respect constitutional principles. It is clear from the
debates prior to ratification of the Constitution and the addition of
the Bill of Rights that the Framers recognized that certain rights,

65

See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 32–33, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 071054 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2008). See also Conference Call, supra note 58.
67
Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief, supra note 58, at 18.
68
Lyle Denniston, U.S.: Time to Act Is Now On Detainee Case,
SCOTUSblog.com, March 11, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/us-timeto-act-now-on-detainee-case/.
66
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namely liberty rights, were natural rights. 69
The Supreme Court has confirmed the importance of natural
rights by making clear that even in the context of a national
emergency, government encroachment upon natural and
fundamental rights is only legitimate if it is sufficiently justified.70
The Court’s historical view of the right to liberty was clearly
embraced by Justice Harlan, who in 1883 recognized it as a
“natural right of man” and encouraged a government policy that
would acknowledge the Constitution as one “of government,
founded by the people . . . for the establishment of justice, for the
general welfare, and for a perpetuation of the blessings of
liberty.”71 The government’s use of CSRTs in the context of the
War on Terror fails to acknowledge that even Guantanamo
detainees have a natural right to liberty. Though the government’s
national security rationale for its CSRT policy may be legitimate,
the government nevertheless insufficiently justifies the extent of its
encroachment. The government’s failure to adhere to its great
responsibility of protecting liberty has thus undermined our own
constitutional system.
A. The Framers and Natural Rights
The Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights, is an expression
of principles as well as an enumeration of specific guarantees. 72
These principles reflect the Framers’ objective to secure individual
69

See The Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 55–60. While the Framers
explicitly enumerated certain rights in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, they
understood that those documents “did not create or generate many of the rights
they secured. Rather, they merely re-stated, or declared, the rights that the
people already possessed.” Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law and
the Court Over the Constitution, 75 CIN . L. REV . 1499, 1503 (2007) (internal
citations omitted).
70
See Home Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
71
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48–49, 52 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
72
Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION 13, 16 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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liberty, 73 and can perhaps best be understood according to an
“individual natural rights model” of constitutional interpretation. 74
Accordingly, certain rights predate the Constitution rather than the
Constitution establishing rights to be derived from the document
itself.75 Although Federalists and their opponents may have
disagreed about whether to include a Bill of Rights, 76 they
nonetheless agreed that inherent individual rights, namely individual
liberty, were natural rights that did not derive from the
Constitution.77 Thus the individual liberty right as understood by
73
74

Id.
See

generally RANDY E. BARNETT , RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: T HE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
75
Similarly, the explicit enumeration of certain rights should not be
construed to diminish those that are not expressly enumerated. Corwin, supra
note 1, at 70–71 (“Principles of transcendental justice . . . [as understood in]
terms of personal and private rights . . . is the same as that of the principles from
which they spring and which they reflect. They owe nothing to their recognition
in the Constitution—such recognition was necessary if the Constitution was to
be regarded as complete.”).
76
Though much debate surrounding the ratification of the Constitution
hinged on the issue of whether or not to include the Bill of Rights in the final
document—opponents of which argued that including it was both unnecessary
and dangerous—it is widely accepted that both supporters and opponents shared
a belief in natural rights. See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing
Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), reprinted in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS 437, 444 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (“[A] great number of the . . .
champions for republican liberty, have thought such a provision, not only
unnecessary, but . . . some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous.”); see
also The Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 7–8, 27 (“Because the
Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers, these enumerated
limits constituted a bill of rights [, and] [b]y attempting to enumerate any rights
to be protected, it would imply that all that were not listed were surrendered.”)
(internal citations omitted). James Madison attempted to allay those fears when
he explained the necessity of the Bill of Rights before the House of
Representatives, stating that it would, “expressly declare the great rights of
mankind secured under this constitution.” Madison, supra note 76, at 444.
77
It is clear that the Framers understood natural rights—and specifically
liberty rights—as rights possessed by all persons, not just citizens. For
example, Theodore Sedgwick, a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, objected to including in the Bill of Rights those that are “selfevident, unalienable [and which] the people possess.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759
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the Framers may be invoked by all persons because of its status as
a natural right rather than merely because it is explicitly protected
under the Constitution.78
B. The Supreme Court, Natural Rights and National
Emergencies79
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to seek a writ
of habeas corpus as a safeguard of personal liberty against arbitrary
government encroachment.80 Federal law provides the Executive the
ability to respond to national emergencies using inherent or implied
constitutional power or authority delegated from Congress;81
however, the Supreme Court has instructed that even in times of

(Jospeh Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 1789).
The Framers’ understanding of individual liberty rights as broadly
applicable is also evident in their explicit use of the words “men” and
“mankind” during ratification debates. See, e.g., The Debates in the Convention
of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec.
4, 1781), in 2 T HE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 415, 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed. 1907) (remarks of James Wilson) at 27 (“Enumerate all the rights of men! I
am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted
such a thing.”). See also Rosen, supra note 12, at 1075.
78
The inclusion of the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution is evidence
of the Framers’ recognition of individual, natural and preexisting rights that,
even if not enumerated in the Constitution itself, were nonetheless retained. The
Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 13–14, 29.
79
The term “national emergency” in the context of Executive power does
not have a hard and fast definition, but has been interpreted by the Congress and
the Supreme Court as the existence of unexpected and dangerous conditions that
do not lend themselves to resolution according to precedent. HAROLD C.
RELYEA , NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 4 (Cong. Research Serv., Aug. 30,
2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf.
80
See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969) (“ The writ of
habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action.”).
81
See Relyea, supra note 79, at 1. The Executive has used these powers to
respond to emergency conditions as far back as 1792. Id. at 5. Until the 20th
century, however, the power was largely unchallenged by Congress or the
Supreme Court. Id. at 6–7.
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national emergency, the government must shoulder the burden of
justification when it seeks to curtail individual liberty or other
constitutional rights.82
i. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell and the
Great Depression83
The Supreme Court required the government to carry the
burden of justification in the 1934 case Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.84 In response to widespread
unemployment and mortgage foreclosures, as well as low wages
and poor credit, the Minnesota state legislature passed a statute
that allowed individuals facing foreclosure to petition a state court
to postpone the sale of their homes and to extend the statutory
redemption period.85 Pursuant to this statute, individuals who had
defaulted on their mortgage and whose property had been
foreclosed petitioned a Minnesota state court for an extension of
82

See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939) (“[W]here legislative
abridgment of [fundamental] rights is asserted . . . the delicate and difficult task
falls upon the courts to . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
[by the government] in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights.”).
83
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell came before the Court
during the severe economic depression of the early 1930s. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Against this backdrop, the Court characterized a national emergency as one that
requires “limited and temporary interpositions [on constitutional rights] if made
necessary by a great public calamity . . . [or] vital public interests would . . .
suffer.” Id. at 439–40.
84
See id. at 442 (“The Court also decided that while the declaration by the
legislature as to the existence of the emergency was entitled to great respect, it
was not conclusive . . . It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the
exigency still exists upon which the continued operation of the law depends.”).
85
Id. at 422 n.3, 424–25. “Redemption” refers to the legal right of a party
who borrows money to purchase a property to regain ownership of that property
after it has been sold at a foreclosure sale due to nonpayment. State statutes often
give parties with mortgages a certain period of time to pay the amount for which
the property was sold at the foreclosure sale—the “redemption period”—and
typically parties are entitled to remain on the premises during that period of
time. See 1 HON. W ILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN , T HE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS § 8:21 (2007).
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the redemption period.86 The court granted the extension, and the
owner of the mortgage appealed on grounds that it violated the
Constitution’s Contract Clause.87 The Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld the state statute as a valid exercise of the government’s
power to respond to an emergency, though it acknowledged that
the statute impaired the obligations of the underlying mortgage
contract.88
On appeal, the Supreme Court looked to the historical
understanding and interpretations of the Contract Clause for
guidance.89 The Court recognized that in times of national
emergency, the government may utilize its power to respond to
exigent conditions, but that doing so “must be consistent with the
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power.”90 By way
of explanation, the Court analogized that, “the war power of the
Federal Government is not created by the emergency of war, but it
is a power given to meet that emergency . . . [however] even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding

86

Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 418–19. Petitioners argued that because of the
economic depression, they were unable to redeem their property, and without
relief from the court in the form of an extension, they would lose it. Id. at 419.
87
Id. at 420.
88
Id. at 420–21.
89
The Court stated that because the constitutional grant and limitation of
power in the Contract Clause was general, affording “a broad outline,” it was
necessary to “fill in the details.” Id. at 426. The Court noted that although the
debates in the Constitutional Convention did not provide guidance for
interpreting the Contract Clause, the “reasons which led to the adoption of that
clause . . . are not left in doubt . . . .” Id. at 427. The Court explained that debt
and legislative interferences with private contracts were so widespread during the
Revolutionary period as to undermine “the confidence essential to prosperous
trade . . . and the utter destruction of credit was threatened.” Id. The inclusion of
the Contract Clause was necessary both to preserve individual rights to contract
and to limit the government’s power to encroach on that right. Id. at 427–28.
The Court went on to examine prior courts’ interpretation and application of the
Contract Clause in determining its scope, concluding that the Contract Clause
“should not be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions”
on individuals’ rights to enter into and enforce private contracts if the
government is faced with a national emergency. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
90
Id.
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essential liberties.”91 The Court ultimately upheld the statute,
reasoning that government’s limited encroachment on the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution’s Contract Clause was permissible
in light of the exigent circumstances presented by the severe
economic recession.92
While the Court made clear that “[e]mergency does not create
power” and that the government may only act consistent with
constitutional limitations, 93 practical realities might require a
compromise between individual rights—in this case, the right of the
mortgage-holders to expect that their private contracts be
enforced—and protecting the national interest.94 Such a
compromise is legitimate so long as it is appropriately targeted to a
particular emergency and conducted pursuant to reasonable
conditions.95 Here, the Court found that the statute met those
conditions, and thus that the government did not impermissibly
encroach on the mortgage holders’ rights guaranteed in the
Constitution’s Contract Clause.
Like the state of emergency that existed in Blaisdell, the War on
Terror presents conditions that call for a degree of deference to the
government in its efforts to protect the national interest. Unlike in
Blaisdell, however, the government’s CSRT policy is not a
legitimate compromise between individual rights and protecting the
national interest. While it appears clear that the government’s
policy is sufficiently targeted to a particular exigency—the War on
Terror—it is not conducted pursuant to reasonable conditions.
91

Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
Id. at 444–47.
93
Id. at 424.
94
Id. at 440.
95
The Court explained that the state statute was reasonable because the
conditions on the extension of the redemption period did not undermine the
integrity of the mortgage contract itself. Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 433 (1934). For example, the Court noted that interest
continued to run on the contract, the validity of the foreclosure sale was
maintained if the property-owner failed to redeem the property during the
extension, and any other statutory conditions on redemption were left intact. Id.
at 445–46. Moreover, the Court emphasized the fact that the state statute only
postponed the redemption period to a specified date, and as a result the statute
could not outlive the emergency for which it was created. Id. at 447.
92
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While the statute in Blaisdell extended deadlines and left the
underlying mortgage contract intact, 96 the government’s CSRT
policies do not merely limit detainees’ rights; rather, the policies
arguably eliminate detainees’ rights altogether.97 Moreover, in
Blaisdell, the government’s power to interfere with individuals’
contracts and grant extensions was subject to an articulated
deadline whereas the government’s CSRT policy is not limited in
duration.98 Because the government may detain individuals for the
duration of the War on Terror99—which is essentially of indefinite
duration100—and because every foreign national held at
Guantanamo is subject to the CSRT process, 101 there is no real
limitation on the government’s power. Thus, while the War on
Terror provides the government an important justification for its
actions, any compromise between individual rights and national
security must be subject to reasonable conditions in order to be
legitimate. Mandating minimal procedural guarantees for detainees
during the CSRT process would provide those conditions, and
would thus form the basis for an acceptable compromise between
96

During the extension of the redemption period, the integrity of the
mortgage contract remained intact, interest on it continued to run, the validity of
the foreclosure sale as well as the right of the purchaser to obtain a deficiency
judgment were maintained, and any other conditions on the redemption period
pursuant to existing statutory law remained as they were prior to the extension.
Id. at 433.
97
CSRTs in practice do not provide detainees any real opportunity to
challenge an enemy combatant designation. See infra Part III.C.
98
The Court emphasized in Blaisdell that the statute in question was
explicitly temporary. 290 U.S. at 439–40. In contrast, neither the Wolfowitz
Memorandum outlining CSRTs nor the England Memorandum implementing
them articulate any limit on their duration. See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra
note 30; see also England Memorandum, supra note 34.
99
In 2004, the Supreme Court said in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force authorizes the President to detain
enemy combatants for the “duration of the conflict.” 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004).
100
President Bush has acknowledged that the duration of the “War on
Terror” is unknown, stating, “[w]e cannot know the duration of this war.” Press
Release, George W. Bush, President of the U.S., The White House, President
Submits Wartime Budget (March 25, 2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-2.html).
101
See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30.
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individual rights and national security while legitimizing the
government’s actions and conforming with fundamental
constitutional principles.
ii. United States v. Robel and the Communist Threat102
Several decades after the Court’s landmark decision in Blaisdell,
the Court again had the opportunity to examine the degree to which
the government may curtail constitutional rights in the context of a
national emergency. This time, the Cold War and the threat of
Communism provided the impetus for government action. In 1967,
in United States v. Robel, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the Subversive Activities Control Act, which
prohibited any member of a “Communist-action organization” from
maintaining employment at a “defense facility.”103 The defendant
was a member of the Communist party, and was subsequently
prohibited from working at his job in a shipyard.104 The
102

In 1950, President Truman proclaimed a state of national emergency in
response to the hostilities in Korea. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029
(Dec. 16, 1950). See also RELYEA , supra note 79, at 8. The state of emergency
was not terminated at the end of the Korean conflict, however, due “to the
continuance of the Cold War atmosphere which . . . made the imminent threat of
hostilities an accepted fact of everyday life, with ‘emergency’ the normal state of
affairs.” EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES: PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW NOW
IN EFFECT DELEGATING TO THE EXECUTIVE EXTRAORDINARY AUTHORITY IN
T IME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY at 5, S. REP. N O. 93-549 (1973) (Conf. Rep.)
[hereinafter EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES]. In 1973, a Special Senate
Committee charged with examining the use of emergency power during national
emergencies recommended that Congress terminate the state of national
emergency then in effect. See generally id.
103
389 U.S. 258, 259 (1967).
104
Id. at 260. The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 required the
registration of Communist organizations with the Attorney General, and created
the Subversive Activities Control Board which was charged with investigating
people suspected of “un-American activities.” Laura K. Donohue, Article:
Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV .
233, 246 (2005). In addition to general registration requirements, the Act
provided that any member of a Communist organization under a final order to
register was prohibited from working anywhere designated as a “defense facility”
by the Secretary of Defense. Robel, 389 U.S. at 260. The defendant, Mr. Robel,
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government justified the statute under “Congress’ war power . . .
[as the] Court ha[d] given broad deference to the exercise of that
constitutional power by the national legislature.”105
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the
government’s legitimate national security concerns106 but stated
that the government had encroached too deeply on the
constitutional right of association protected by the First
Amendment.107 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional,
the Court stated that, “the phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked
as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional
power which can be brought within its ambit.”108 The Court
focused on the lack of a clear, rational connection between the
defendant and the harm the government sought to prevent, as the
statute established guilt on the basis of association with the
Communist Party without requiring a showing that the individual
actually posed a danger to the national interest.109 Congress’
concern over national defense was certainly not without merit—the
1950s and early 1960s were the height of McCarthyism, and Cold
War escalation as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 caused
widespread security concerns throughout the country.
Notwithstanding the fear and paranoia that marked the Cold War
era,110 however, the Court stated that the statute itself imposed too
was a member of the Communist party employed at a shipyard in Seattle,
Washington. Id. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense designated the shipyard in
which the defendant worked as a defense facility, and his continued employment
there subjected him to prosecution under the Act. Id.
105
Id. at 263.
106
Id. at 266–67.
107
Id. at 264. Like the right to liberty, the right of assembly preserved by
the First Amendment was also an individual natural right possessed by the
people and which existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution. The Ninth
Amendment, supra note 11, at 13–14.
108
Id.
109
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
110
President Truman’s 1950 proclamation exemplified the widespread
anxiety felt throughout the United States at the time:
Whereas recent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat
to the peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and
those of the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict;
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substantial a burden on the defendant’s legitimate constitutional
rights.111
Here, like in Robel, the government cannot justify its CSRT
policy simply by pointing to the War on Terror. Certainly the
government’s interest in protecting national security is as legitimate
now as it was during the Cold War.112 Nevertheless, like the policy
at issue in Robel, CSRTs often establish guilt by association
without requiring the government to establish that a detainee
actually poses the danger of which he is accused113—the Supreme
Court explicitly held such a policy unjustifiable in Robel.114
Moreover, just as in Robel, here there are feasible alternatives to
and Whereas world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of
the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world; and
Whereas, if the goal of communist imperialism were to be achieved, the
people of this country would no longer enjoy the full and rich life they
have . . . ; and Whereas, the increasing menace of the forces of
communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United
States be strengthened as speedily as possible.
EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES, supra note 102 (quoting Proclamation No.
2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 16, 1950)).
111
Robel, 389 U.S. at 267–68 (“Our decision today . . . recognizes that,
when legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a
substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must
achieve its goal by means which have a less drastic impact on the continued
vitality of First Amendment freedoms . . . In this case, the means chosen by
Congress are contrary to the letter and spirit of the First Amendment.”) (internal
quotations and italics omitted). The existence of alternative methods to protect
national security interests, such as prescribing criminal penalties, further
restricting access to state secrets or positions in national defense industries, or a
more thorough security screening program, presented Congress with just such
“less drastic” means. Id. at 267.
112
The 1950s and early 1960s experienced the escalation of the Cold War
and the threat of mutually assured destruction, and the United States government
perceived a real and imminent threat to its security. Today, the threat of
terrorism is perceived as just as real and imminent, if not more so, because that
threat materialized into an attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001.
113
See infra Part III.C. CSRTs permit the use of hearsay evidence as well
as evidence obtained by torture or coercion. In addition, CSRTs have upheld
enemy combatant status designations based upon unsubstantiated anonymous
allegations. See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38.
114
Robel, 389 U.S. at 265.
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the government’s present CSRT system, many of which have been
suggested by members of Congress and even the Administration.115
So while the Executive may indeed respond to national
emergencies using inherent or implied constitutional power or
authority delegated from Congress, as it did after September 11,
2001, the Supreme Court has made clear that even national
emergencies do not provide the government a free pass.
III. COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS
Despite their stated purpose, CSRT standards and procedures
fail to provide a detainee with the opportunity to challenge his
enemy combatant status designation. Detainees’ slightly expanded
procedural rights in the form of access to counsel and an expanded
scope of the record during the D.C. Circuit’s limited review of
CSRTs—currently “the sole mechanism by which detention may
be challenged”116—do not remedy the underlying infirmity of the
CSRT process itself. According to the England Memorandum,
discussed below, the CSRT process was meant “to determine, in a
fact-based proceeding, whether the individuals detained . . . [at]
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified as enemy
combatants and to permit each detainee the opportunity to contest
such designation.”117 However, the “opportunity” provided “was
far less than the written procedures appear to require.”118 Because
CSRTs neither comport with the fundamental elements of due
process nor sufficiently respect traditional constitutional
principles, CSRTs fail to protect against arbitrary government
encroachment on the right to liberty. 119

115

See infra Part IV.
Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Senator Arlen Specter in Support
of Petitioners at 12, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United
States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Brief of Senator Specter].
117
England Memorandum, supra note 34.
118
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 4.
119
Brief of Senator Specter, supra note 116, at 13.
116
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A. The Hasty Introduction of CSRTs
Only one week after the Supreme Court decided in Rasul that
Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge the legality of their
detentions in federal court,120 the DOD issued a memorandum
creating CSRTs and directed the Secretary of the Navy to
promulgate guidelines for implementation.121 The Secretary of the
Navy, Gordon England, issued a memorandum on July 29, 2004
outlining the formation and procedures of CSRTs,122 specifying: 1)
the basic structure and process of a CSRT; 2) the specific duties
and qualifications of CSRT participants; and 3) the detainees’ role
in the CSRT process.123 Though the England Memorandum
elaborated upon the basic framework provided by the DOD in the
Wolfowitz Memorandum,124 it failed to provide the procedural
guarantees that would ensure the legitimacy of the CSRT process
and preserve traditional American constitutional principles.
The government has repeatedly justified its CSRT policy as a
wartime exigency125 despite the policy’s discordance with the

120

See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30.
122
England Memorandum, supra note 34. The Wolfowitz Memorandum
that initially established CSRTs designated the Secretary of the Navy as the
Convening Authority, and directed him to issue implementing guidelines.
Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30.
123
See England Memorandum, supra note 34.
124
Id.
125
In defending the CSRT system on the Senate floor, Senator Lindsay
Graham stated that, “to substitute a judge for the military in a time of war to
determine something as basic as who our enemy is is not only not necessary
under our Constitution, it impedes the war effort, [and] it is irresponsible.” 152
CONG . R. S10354 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (Statement of Sen. Graham).
Similarly, the government has defended the propriety of CSRT procedures on
the basis that wartime exigencies mandate a system that provides for “the
detention of the enemy in wartime; the operation of a secure naval facility
overseas; civilian access to enemy detainees, and the handling of classified
national security information,” none of which can be satisfied in a traditional
judicial setting. Corrected Brief for Respondent Addressing Pending Preliminary
Motions at 26, Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2007) (Nos. 061197, 06-1397).
121
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traditional guarantees of due process.126 As the Supreme Court has
noted, national security is not a catchall justification for any
government action:
[T]he concept of “national defense” cannot be deemed an
end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power
designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term
“national defense” is the notion of defending those values
and ideals which sets this Nation apart . . . . It would indeed
be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.127
Certainly the government’s objective in defending the nation is
a legitimate end and should be accorded due weight, but not
without considering whether the means adopted are both
appropriate and within the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”128
Thus, the primary inquiry is whether the CSRT procedures respect
our own constitutional imperatives. As will be discussed below,
126

Though the government has argued that CSRT procedures are sufficient
to satisfy constitutional requirements, it has ardently maintained that
Guantanamo detainees’ non-citizen status precludes them from invoking
constitutional protections. See Opening Brief for the United States, et al., Al
Odah v. United States, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2005) (Nos. 05-5064,
05-5095 through 05-5116). Joseph Marguilies, a Minneapolis civil liberties
attorney who represented detainees in challenging the government’s detention
policy in Rasul v. Bush, described the CSRT process as a system that “forces
an alien prisoner unfamiliar with our justice system and held incommunicado to
disprove allegations he cannot see, and whose reliability he cannot test, before a
military panel whose superiors have repeatedly pre-judged the result, all without
counsel.” JOSEPH MARGUILIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 170 (2006). The government has defended CSRTs as a
legitimate means by which a prisoner might contest his enemy combatant
status, but some have accused the government of creating CSRTs solely to give
the appearance that detainees are not being held at Guantanamo “beyond the
law.” Id. at 169–70.
127
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
128
Chief Justice Marshall famously declared in McCulloch v. Maryland:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.” 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).
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CSRTs fail to meet even this standard.129
B. The CSRT Participants and Procedures
The government depicts CSRTs as non-adversarial proceedings
wherein neutral panels determine whether detainees already
classified as enemy combatants actually meet the criteria for such a
designation, and in which detainees are afforded more than
sufficient procedural guarantees.130 CSRT procedures as outlined in
129

It is important to make explicit the focus of this inquiry. It is not a
question of whether the procedures afforded detainees actually satisfy explicitly
delineated constitutional requirements. Rather, the question is whether the
procedures afforded the detainees are in line with traditional constitutional
principles. This is unquestionably a much lower standard.
130
The government has argued that CSRTs are “virtually identical” to the
tribunals conducted pursuant to Army Regulation 190-8, which implements
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33,
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196
(U.S. Dec. 5, 2007); see also Brief for the Boumediene Respondents at 50,
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196
(U.S. Oct. 9, 2007). In defending CSRTs before the Supreme Court, the
government noted that, like Army Regulation 190-8, CSRTs are:
Composed of three commissioned officers plus a non-voting officer who
serves as a recorder; [CSRT] members are sworn to faithfully and
impartially execute their duties; The detainee has the right to attend the
open portions of the proceedings; An interpreter is provided if
necessary; The detainee has the right to call relevant witnesses if
reasonably available, question witnesses called by the [CSRT], and
testify or otherwise address the [CSRT]; The detainee may not be
forced to testify; The [CSRTs] make decisions by majority vote; The
decision is made based on a preponderance of the evidence; The
[CSRTs] create a written report of their decision; and The [CSRT]
record is reviewed by the Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency.
Id. at 50–51. In addition, the government argued that in fact CSRTs provide
more procedural guarantees than Army Regulation 190-8 in that CSRTs provide
detainees with a Personal Representative, detainees are provided with an
unclassified summary of the government’s evidence and are permitted to present
their own documentary evidence, and the Recorder is obligated pursuant to
CSRT procedures to provide the panel with any relevant potentially exculpatory
information. Id. at 51–52.
While the government is correct to point out the similarities between
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the England Memorandum guarantee that detainees are supplied
interpreters if necessary and that each detainee be appointed a
Personal Representative to explain the nature of the CSRT and
assist him in the proceedings.131 Detainees are to be presented with
an unclassified summary of the charges against them, are permitted
to testify before the CSRT panel but are not required to do so, and
are permitted to cross-examine government witnesses or call their
own, so long as they are “reasonably available.”132
The reality of CSRT proceedings present a much darker
picture. Armed guards bring the detainee, shackled at the hands and
feet, to a small room where he is seated against the wall and chained
to the floor.133 The detainee sits across from his Personal
Representative, an interpreter, a paralegal, and the Recorder,134
whose function is most analogous to that of an “investigator and
prosecutor, [who] has nearly complete control over the information
that reaches a CSRT hearing panel.”135 The three members of the
panel, all commissioned military officers who make the ultimate
determination as to whether the detainee was properly designated
as an enemy combatant, sit off to one side of the room.136

CSRTs and the procedures authorized in Army Regulation 190-8 as well as
those CSRT procedures which, in the government’s view, exceed the guarantees
afforded in the army regulation, those similarities do not speak to the infirmities
in the CSRT process. For example, permitting a detainee to call reasonably
available witnesses is meaningless if the CSRT panel almost always concludes
that detainees’ witness requests are not reasonably available. See Denbeaux &
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 31–33. A guarantee that a detainee may question
witnesses presented against him is meaningful only if government witnesses
actually appear at his CSRT. It is really no guarantee at all if, as has been
reported, the government “did not produce any witnesses in any hearing.” Id. at
2. That CSRTs are required to create a written report of their decisions provides
only a nominal procedural guarantee if that decision is based upon evidence
obtained by coercion or anonymous or otherwise unsupported conclusory
statements. Id. at 33–36.
131
England Memorandum, supra note 34.
132
See id.
133
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 20.
134
Id.
135
Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief, supra note 58, at 4.
136
Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30.
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When gathering evidence to present to the panel, the Recorder
is directed to examine all “reasonably available” information in the
government’s possession relevant to a detainee’s enemy combatant
status designation,137 and at his discretion includes “such evidence
. . . as may be sufficient to support the detainee’s classification as
an enemy combatant.”138 He is then charged with compiling an
unclassified summary that he presents to the CSRT panel for
review.139 In essence, the Recorder has access to information in the
137

The England Memorandum refers to the entire body of information in
the government’s possession about a particular detainee as “Government
Information,” and defines such information as:
[S]uch reasonably available information in the possession of the U.S.
Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the
criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant, including information
generated in connection with the initial determination to hold the
detainee as an enemy combatant and in any subsequent reviews of that
determination, as well as any records, determinations, or reports
generated in connection with such proceedings.
England Memorandum, supra note 34, at Enclosure 1. The Recorder is charged
with reviewing this large body of information, and at his discretion chooses
what to present to the CSRT panel. Id.
138
The England Memorandum refers to this smaller subset of information
as “Government Evidence.” England Memorandum, supra note 34, at Enclosure
1–2.
139
Id. at Enclosure 1. The Recorder is also responsible for preparing a
“record” of the proceedings, which consists of the documentary evidence
presented to the panel, witness transcripts, any evidence presented by the
detainee, and “the findings of fact upon which the [panel’s] decision was based.”
Id. Certainly the Recorder need not include information that is duplicative or
irrelevant. Of concern is the fact that the Recorder is not required to present to a
CSRT panel all information in the government’s possession that is relevant to a
detainee—what the England Memorandum terms “Government Information”—
but rather only information that he deems sufficient to support a detainee’s
enemy combatant status designation, or “Government Evidence.” See id.
Moreover, the Recorder has unchecked discretion in his presentation of
exculpatory evidence, if there is any. Thus, there is a real possibility that the
government could possess relevant information, some of which might be
exculpatory, that the Recorder is not required to present to the panel.
The scope of the record is also implicated if a detainee petitions the D.C.
Circuit for a review of his CSRT, pursuant to his right to do so under the DTA.
Until recently the D.C. Circuit Court was only permitted to review the record
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government’s possession about a particular detainee that is not
necessarily presented to the panel. Perhaps more importantly,
CSRT regulations direct the Recorder to present to the panel any
potentially exculpatory evidence, but the Recorder’s decisions are
neither reviewed nor checked by any process to confirm that the
panel was given all relevant information.140
As for the Personal Representative, while he is authorized to
“assist” the detainee, the England Memorandum makes clear that
this officer acts neither as a lawyer nor as an advocate.141 In fact, a
Personal Representative does little more than explain the process
to the detainee in meetings that are often brief and rarely take place
more than once.142 The other so-called “guarantees” outlined in the
presented to the CSRT panel, but the scope of the record on review in the D.C.
Circuit is now being challenged. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.
2007), reh’g en banc denied, Bismullah III, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
petition for cert. filed, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07A-677 (U.S. 2008). Though
the D.C. Circuit Court recently agreed with detainees that it should be privy to
the entire body of information in the government’s possession relevant to a
detainee when reviewing a CSRT, see Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178, in February
2008 the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the D.C.
Circuit Court’s order, or in the alternative for the Supreme Court to examine the
scope of review on the merits. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 33, Gates v.
Bismullah, No. 07-1054 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2008).
140
Petitioners’ Joint Brief in Support of Pending Motions to Set
Procedures and for Entry of Protective Order at 7, Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178
(D.C. Cir. March 26, 2007) (Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397).
141
Id. The England Memorandum directs the Personal Representative to
state the following at each initial meeting with a detainee:
I am neither your lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the
responsibility of assisting your preparation for the hearing. None of the
information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be
obligated to divulge it at the hearing. I am available to assist you in
preparing an oral or written presentation to the [panel] should you
desire to do so.
Id.
142
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 14. Mark Denbeaux, a
professor at Seton Hall University School of Law and counsel to two detainees
held at Guantanamo, undertook an analysis of CSRT proceedings at
Guantanamo. His study compared “the hearing process that the detainees were
promised with the process actually provided.” Id. at 4. The results of the study
are based on records from 393 of the 558 detainees for whom CSRTs were
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England Memorandum similarly fall far short of the minimal
procedural safeguards that would be necessary to ensure both the
legitimacy of the CSRT system and adherence to our overarching
constitutional system.
C. CSRTs Do Not Provide Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Although the fundamental right to liberty exists regardless of
one’s citizenship, such a right is meaningless without adequate
protective measures, which lie in procedural due process guarantees
and judicial review. Indeed, the Framers saw the judiciary as the
protector of fundamental rights. Thomas Jefferson expressed his
understanding that the Bill of Rights would be “the legal check [on
the threat to rights] which it puts into the hands of the
judiciary.”143 James Madison expressed his understanding of the
courts as “the guardians of those rights.”144 The CSRT process
does not begin to provide even minimal procedural guarantees to
ensure that the government does not use its congressionally
recognized power to detain enemy combatants at Guantanamo
arbitrarily. Thus the legitimacy of the detentions as well as our
commitment to the natural law principles underlying the
Constitution are severely undermined.
Although the government has strenuously argued that the
conducted. Of those 393 detainees, only 102 full CSRT records are available. Id.
In addition to the 102 full CSRT records, Professor Denbeaux reviewed 356
“transcripts”—summarized detainee statements—that were released by the DOD
as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit initiated by the Associated
Press. Id. at 7. After comparing the transcripts with the full CSRT records, the
study concluded that of the 558 detainees for whom CSRTs were conducted,
202 detainees chose not to participate in the process; of the 102 full hearing
records available, forty-three of them represent CSRTs where the detainee was
not physically present. Id. at 8.
143
McAffee, supra note 69, at 1522 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ , T HE BILL OF
R IGHTS: A D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 620 (1971)).
144
Id. at 1523 (quoting Madison’s statement of June 8, 1789, in
CREATING THE B ILL OF RIGHTS: T HE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 83–84 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowing, & Charlene
Bangs Bickford eds., 1991)).
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procedures afforded detainees need not satisfy constitutional
requirements because detainees held at Guantanamo do not have
constitutional rights, 145 this argument ignores the values and
principles underlying the Constitution—values which are
“essential components of the rule of law.”146 Even if the
Constitution does not apply to detainees per se, those principles
underlying the Constitution are still applicable and thus mandate
that we provide, at a minimum, procedural guarantees that conform
with the American notion of due process. In order to “ensure that
the rule of law prevails at Guantanamo,”147 detainees must be
afforded a system of adequate substantive and procedural
safeguards to ensure that long-held constitutional principles are not
compromised.148
145

See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Both the government
and the D.C. Circuit Court have relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Johnson v. Eisentrager to deny detainees at Guantanamo constitutional rights.
Johnson examined the rights of a group of German nationals captured by
American forces in China during World War II who were tried and convicted by
a military commission sitting in China, and subsequently sent to Germany to
serve out their sentences. Id. at 765–66. In holding that nonresident enemy
aliens captured and detained abroad have no right to petition a United States
court for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court explained that non-resident
aliens have historically only been permitted access to United States courts if
they could demonstrate some arguable presence within the United States. Id. at
776–78. In contrast, the German detainees in this case “at no relevant time were
within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.” Id. at 777. In denying
Guantanamo detainees the right to seek writs of habeas corpus, both the
government and the courts have borrowed the rationale from Johnson, explaining
that because Guantanamo detainees are non-resident aliens captured abroad and
detained in Cuba, Johnson precludes any constitutional right to habeas corpus.
See Opening Brief for the United States at 15, Al-Odah v. United States, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2007) (Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116);
see also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002). This reasoning
has been widely criticized, and even the Supreme Court called such a
comparison into question in Rasul. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476–78
(2004).
146
Brief of Specialists in Israeli Military Law, supra note 14, at 4.
147
Brief of Senator Specter, supra note 116, at 4.
148
That is not to say that non-citizen prisoners captured and detained
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The traditional understanding of due process—fundamental to
an adversarial system149—is inextricably linked with “the right to
present a defense (including the right to testify and to call
witnesses); . . . representation by counsel . . . and the right to
confront and cross-examine.”150 But because CSRTs are explicitly
non-adversarial,151 they cannot provide detainees with that
opportunity. Technically, the England Memorandum sets out
provisions to allow detainees the opportunity to “participate” in
the CSRT process by giving them:
[T]he assistance of a Personal Representative; an
interpreter if necessary; an opportunity to review
unclassified information; the opportunity to appear
personally to present reasonably available information
relevant to [his classification] as an enemy combatant; the
opportunity to question witnesses . . . ; and, to the extent
abroad must necessarily be able to invoke all potential procedural safeguards
existing within the broadest application of constitutional due process. Such an
argument has been widely criticized for its incompatibility with the Executive’s
constitutional war powers and because of the far-reaching ramifications of extraterritorial application of constitutional rights. See Tung Yin, Procedural Due
Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73
T ENN . L. REV . 351, 366, 373–75 (2006). See also Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784
(“If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world . . . [s]uch a
construction would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy
elements, guerrilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’ could require the American
Judiciary to assure them [constitutional protections] . . . . No decision of this
court suggests such a view.”). This Note asserts that one of the “primary
purposes” of the Due Process Clause—to protect the natural right to liberty
against arbitrary encroachment by the government—is instructive in determining
what procedures should be afforded to Guantanamo detainees. An examination of
the ramifications of extra-territorial application of all constitutional rights is
beyond the scope of this Note.
149
The term “adversarial system” is a legal term of art that refers to “a
procedural system, such as the Anglo-American legal system, involving active
and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before an
independent decision-maker.” BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY 58 (8th ed. 2004).
150
Yin, supra note 148, at 401 (internal citations omitted).
151
England Memorandum, supra note 34. “Non-adversarial” as used here
is a legal term of art that contrasts the traditional American adversary system.
See supra note 149.

696

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

they are reasonably available, the opportunity to call
witnesses on his behalf.152
Despite the supposed procedures afforded detainees in the
England Memorandum’s implementing guidelines, detainees’
requests to see government evidence, witnesses, or even testimony
from other detainees at Guantanamo have almost always been
denied.153 These guarantees, therefore, are illusory at best. Written
accounts and studies of CSRTs demonstrate the extent to which
their procedures undermine traditional constitutional protections of
liberty and demonstrate a prisoner’s total inability to mount any
kind of meaningful defense.154
i. The Government’s Evidence
CSRT guidelines do not require the government to conform to
traditional rules of evidence, but rather permit the panel to consider
hearsay and evidence possibly obtained through torture or
coercion.155 Such a departure from traditional evidentiary
152

England Memorandum, supra note 34.
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 30. CSRT panels are only
required to honor detainees’ requests for witnesses and evidence if they are
“reasonably available,” though CSRT procedures fail to define this term. Thus,
to deny a detainee’s request, the government need only maintain that the
evidence or witness requested by the detainee was not reasonably available. Id. It
should be noted that although requests for testimony from other detainees were
sometimes granted, the extent to which such testimony might help exonerate a
detainee is questionable, given that such testimony is delivered by a presumed
enemy combatant in favor of another presumed enemy combatant. Id. at 5.
154
See generally id. (concluding that CSRTs are an attempt by the
government to “replace habeas corpus with this no hearing process”); see also
MARGUILIES, supra note 126. Indeed, several detainees have been subject to
second hearings after initially being found not to be enemy combatants, and “at
least one detainee, after his first and second [CSRTs] unanimously determined
him to not be an enemy combatant, had yet a third [CSRT] . . . which finally
found him to be properly classified as an enemy combatant.” Denbeaux &
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 37. Such re-hearings are conducted in abstentia,
and a detainee is not informed that his first CSRT determined he was not an
enemy combatant. Id. at 37–39.
155
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 35–36; see also MARGUILIES,
supra note 126, at 164. The government has maintained that although CSRT
153
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standards, in conjunction with inconsistent adherence to other
evidentiary rules governing the CSRTs, makes reliability
uncertain.156 For example, CSRT panels have been known to rely
procedures permit the panels to consider hearsay evidence or that obtained
through torture or coercion, those procedures also “require [panels] to reject
unreliable evidence based on any concerns regarding coercion that may have
arisen in the proceedings before them.” Brief for the Respondents at 58,
Boumediene v. Bush, 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, 06-1196 (U.S. Oct.
9, 2007). However, whether or not CSRT panel members are aware that the
evidence before them may have been obtained through torture or coercion such
that they might have concerns about its reliability is unclear. The government
punted as to whether the rules permitting questionable evidence might lead to a
determination based on coerced testimony in the case of a specific detainee,
stating, “[t]o the extent the rules are deemed insufficient in any concrete
situation to ensure that determinations are not based on coerced testimony, the
District of Columbia Circuit can say so on DTA review in a case that actually
presents such an issue.” Id. at 58. CSRT panels have affirmed a detainee’s
enemy combatant status only on the basis of anonymous allegations, without
any actual evidence. In the case of Murat Kernaz, a German Muslim of Turkish
descent, a CSRT credited a “single, unsigned document authored by an
unnamed military official who wrote, without supporting evidence, that Kurnaz
was a member of al-Qaeda” despite overwhelming and credible evidence to the
contrary. Id. at 165–66.
156
In 2006, The National Journal reviewed the government’s files on 132
Guantanamo detainees, as well as largely redacted transcripts of the CSRTs for
314 detainees, and concluded that “much of the evidence—even the classified
evidence—gathered by the Defense Department against [the detainees] is flimsy,
second-, third-, fourth- or 12th-hand. It’s based largely on admissions by the
detainees themselves or on coerced, or worse, interrogations of their fellow
inmates, some of whom have been proved to be liars.” Corine Hegland, Empty
Evidence, NAT ’ L J., Feb. 4, 2006. Indeed, the review found that one particular
Guantanamo detainee made accusations against more than 60 other detainees—
“more than 10 percent of Guantanamo’s entire prison population”—placing
many of them at a jihadist training camp. Id. After Syrian detainee Mohammed
al-Tumani’s protestations that he was not at the training camp were bolstered,
perhaps uncharacteristically, by his Personal Representative who took the time
to examine the classified evidence, it was discovered that the aforementioned
accuser “had placed Tumani [at the training camp] three months before the
teenager had even entered Afghanistan.” Id. His curiosity piqued, the Personal
Representative looked into the other detainees the accuser had fingered, and
discovered that “[n]one of the men had been in Afghanistan at the time the
accuser said he saw them at the camp.” Id. Despite the seemingly blatant
unreliability of this evidence, Tumani’s CSRT nonetheless declared him an
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on evidence that a prisoner owns a particular kind of cheap,
common Casio watch as proof that the detainee has or knows how
to make explosives.157 Similarly, one CSRT panel relied on a
detainee’s sarcastic remarks as true admissions of his involvement
with terrorism.158
Of all the information the Recorder may collect about a detainee
and which may ultimately be presented to a CSRT panel, CSRT
guidelines permit a detainee access only to unclassified evidence.159
Though this may certainly seem legitimate given the government’s
national security concerns, because most evidence and other
relevant information presented against a detainee at a CSRT is
classified, practical application means detainees often have no
opportunity to see or rebut any of the evidence presented against
them.160 In fact, in 52% of CSRT proceedings, the government did

enemy combatant. Id.
157
The government has used ownership of a Casio watch, one model of
which has a circuit board that al Qaeda has used for making bombs, as evidence
against at least ten detainees held at Guantanamo. Hegland, supra note 156, at
165; see also MARGUILIES, supra note 126.
158
During one detainee’s CSRT, he was reported to have said, “I saw bin
Laden five times: Three times on Al Jazeera and twice on Yemeni news.”
MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 165. This statement was characterized in the
detainee’s file as an admission to knowing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, after
another detainee sarcastically yelled “Fine, you got me; I’m a terrorist,” the
CSRT panel recorded this statement as an admission despite the fact that the
interrogators recognized it as sarcasm. Id. These statements should have been
accurately conveyed in the detainees’ files, allowing the CSRT panels to make a
more informed assessment. Because this “evidence” was misrepresented, the
panel’s ultimate determination must be called into question.
159
See England Memorandum, supra note 34, at 7. Unclassified evidence
includes documents from family and friends and publicly available documents
released by the government or published by the press. See Denbeaux &
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 24–29. Technically, unclassified evidence also
includes internal government documents labeled “For Official Use Only.”Id.
The extent to which these documents are relied upon is unclear, and independent
studies have charged that the government treats these official documents as
classified despite their unclassified status. Id.
160
See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 25 (“In essence detainees
were not shown any evidence against them, classified or unclassified. Not only
was [certain unclassified but “For Official Use Only”] evidence withheld from
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not present any unclassified evidence in its cases against detainees
but rather relied “solely on the presumptively valid classified
information to meet its burden of proof.”161 Moreover, an
astounding 89% of detainees were not provided any facts or
evidence, unclassified or otherwise.162 These statistics illustrate
that detainees have virtually no access to the vast majority of
documents and information in the government’s possession.
Finally, CSRT determinations often rest upon classified
evidence, which is presumed to be reliable and to which detainees
have no access.163 CSRTs operate under a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the government’s evidence.164 Rebuttable presumptions
are certainly not novel; indeed, courts often use them when direct
proof is impractical or difficult to obtain.165 However, because
the detainee in violation of the CSRT procedures, but other declassified evidence
was also withheld.”).
161
Id. at 22 (“A review of the 361 [available CSRT] transcripts reveals that
the Government may have shown the detainee some evidence before he began his
statement in 4% of the cases. When the hearing began, 89% of the detainees had
no facts to rebut whether from witnesses or from documentary evidence. The
same documents reveal that the [CSRT panel] showed the detainee unclassified
information in only 7% of the hearings. It is unclear why the [CSRT panel]
showed unclassified evidence in some cases but not others.”).
162
Id. at 22, 31.
163
For example, the records for detainee ISN #1463 include the detainee’s
statement that, “[T]here is no attorney here today and I don’t know anything
about the law . . . I cannot say anything that [might] be used against me. I am
even afraid to say what my name is.” MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 163.
During the CSRT proceeding for Mustafa Ait Idir, a Bosnian-Algerian, the
CSRT panel questioned him about charges that he associated with an Al Qaeda
operative and planned to attack the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. When Idir asked
for the name of the al Qaeda operative with whom he had allegedly associated,
the CSRT panel refused, saying it did not know the name of the operative. Idir
responded, “How can I respond to this? . . . If you tell me the name then I can
respond and defend myself against this accusation.” The CSRT panel either
refused or was unable to give him any information, rendering it impossible for
Idir to rebut or contest the accusation. See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note
38, at 16–17.
164
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 19; see also, England
Memorandum, supra note 34.
165
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247–50 (1988),
accord, D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 541–42 (1977).
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CSRT panels may consider evidence that is never shared with
detainees, it is virtually impossible for a detainee to disprove any
evidence supporting the determination that he is an enemy
combatant.166
ii. The Detainees’ Evidence
While CSRT guidelines technically permit a detainee to request
his own exculpatory evidence, those same guidelines also allow the
government to deny a detainee’s request for evidence if it is
irrelevant or if it is not “reasonably available.”167 Such standards
are easily manipulated by the government—CSRTs often fail to
provide any reason at all for denying evidence requests 168 even
when the outside evidence could in fact contribute greatly to the
CSRT process. For example, prior to the CSRT for Mustafa Ait
Idir, a Bosnian-Algerian apprehended in Bosnia and accused of
associating with an al Qaeda operative and planning an attack on
the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, the detainee requested official court
documents from Bosnia which he asserted would have proved that
he had already been cleared of terrorism charges; the government

166

Because the evidence before a CSRT is almost always classified and the
detainee is not permitted access to it, he is “unable to challenge, explain, or
simply rebut it. The rebuttable presumption of validity becomes, in practice, an
irrebutable one.” Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 19. For example,
during the CSRT for detainee ISN # 1463, who was only provided an
unclassified summary of evidence, the detainee said in response to the
allegations against him, “That is not true. I did not help anybody and whoever
is saying that I did, let them present their evidence . . . . It’s not fair for me if
you mask some of the secret information . . . . How can I defend myself?” Id. at
21.
167
England Memorandum, supra note 34, at 4.
168
Detainees ISN #333, ISN #680, and ISN #928 all identified specific
documents or evidence during their CSRTs that they said would exonerate
them, including passports and visas. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at
32–33. In each of their cases, the government failed to procure the identified
evidence after designating the information as not “reasonably available.” Id.
Consequently, each detainee’s enemy combatant status designation was affirmed.
Id.
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refused to grant Idir’s request. 169 Although the Bosnian government
had already investigated Idir and cleared him of terrorism
charges,170 and though Idir’s CSRT panel consulted other legal
documents from Bosnia, the panel determined that the specific
records sought by Idir were not “reasonably available.”171
iii. Witnesses
CSRT guidelines technically give detainees the right to crossexamine the government’s witnesses and to call their own
witnesses. 172 These rights are only meaningful, however, if the
government’s witnesses are actually present at a CSRT and if
detainees’ requests for witnesses are honored. For 393 out of the
558 detainees for whom CSRTs were reportedly conducted at
Guantanamo—and the only CSRTs for which records have actually
been released—the government did not produce a single witness.173
Furthermore, a detainee’s right to call his own witnesses is
severely limited in practice. Because detainees are completely
isolated from the outside world, unable to communicate with
family, and have only limited communication with counsel,174 it is
unclear how a prisoner detained at Guantanamo could practically

169

Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 33. See also MARGUILIES,
supra note 126, at 164.
170
MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 164.
171
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 33. Other records that CSRTs
have determined to be not “reasonably available” include such things as medical
records from a hospital in Jordan and testimony from explicitly identified family
members even though their names, phone numbers and addresses had been
provided by the detainee. Id. at 32. The government is not required to explain
why certain evidence is not reasonably available; a conclusory statement that the
evidence is not reasonably available is a sufficient justification. See generally
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38.
172
England Memorandum, supra note 34.
173
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 21. In these cases, CSRTs
relied on classified information.
174
Detainees are not represented by counsel for purposes of their CSRTs,
though detainees may be represented by counsel, often on a pro bono basis, for
purposes of D.C. Circuit review of their CSRTs.
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locate any witnesses to testify on his behalf.175 In reality, a
detainee’s potential pool of witnesses is limited to other alleged
terrorists similarly detained at Guantanamo. This subset of
witnesses, as well as any proposed witness for the detainee, is
further limited by the CSRT panel’s discretion to decide whether
the witness is “reasonably available.” Unsurprisingly, the panels
do not often honor witness requests. 176 Therefore, while detainees’
requests for testimony from other detainees at Guantanamo were
granted approximately 50% of the time, requests for testimony of
witnesses located outside Guantanamo were uniformly denied.177
IV. M OVING F ORWARD: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
A DMINISTRATION, C ONGRESS AND THE C OURTS
The continuing disagreement among the Supreme Court,
Congress and the Administration over detainees’ rights has resulted
in a six-year struggle between the three branches and has seriously
undermined the credibility of the American constitutional
system.178 The good news, albeit minor, is that recent
175

MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 167.
Id.
177
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 28–29. Requests for witnesses
located outside Guantanamo were denied if not reasonably available or
“irrelevant.” Practical and security considerations regarding the transport of
civilians to Guantanamo to testify at a CSRT could also deem a requested
witness “not reasonably available.” In one case, a CSRT panel denied a
detainee’s request for witnesses because the panel determined that it “would
have been burdened with repetitive, cumulative testimony” by witnesses who
would have testified similarly that the detainee was not an enemy combatant.
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 28. However, CSRT guidelines do
not include a provision for denying witness requests on this basis.
178
Members of Congress and the Administration have directly contributed
to the perpetuation of the struggle over detainees’ rights—had they simply
afforded detainees basic procedural guarantees during the CSRT process to allow
for a meaningful review and the potential for release, it is at least arguable that
detainees’ need to challenge the legality of their detentions in federal court
would have been sharply diminished. Further, it is perhaps even likely that
federal courts at the various stages of the review process might have looked upon
detainees’ petitions with less scrutiny had they been afforded minimal procedural
guarantees in the beginning.
176
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developments in the three branches signal the government’s
recognition of the need to modify the procedures provided to the
Guantanamo detainees.179 Certainly any revised procedures must
allow for legitimate defense of national security interests, but the
most effective procedures will do so without compromising core
constitutional principles. Affording detainees a process that
comports with fundamental constitutional values, while recognizing
the need to tailor the system to take account of particular
exigencies presented by the War on Terror, will strengthen the
United States’ security interest by maintaining the credibility of
the American constitutional system and preserving the core
principles upon which the United States was founded.
A. The Administration
Though the Administration has consistently defended CSRTs
as an effective process for reviewing detainees’ enemy combatant
status, 180 roughly one quarter of detainees cleared by the system

179

For example, in July 2007 the D.C. Circuit Court ruled to expand the
record on review in an action brought under the DTA—a ruling that the
government is now attempting to challenge in the Supreme Court. See
Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Although the government has
challenged the D.C. Circuit’s order to produce an expanded—and more
complete—record during the review of a detainee’s CSRT, various officials from
within the Administration, including some members of the military involved in
the CSRT process, have acknowledged the need to reexamine the procedures
afforded detainees. Commander Jeffrey Gordon of the Navy, a Pentagon
spokesman, said in October 2007 that while no decisions had yet been made to
“redo” any CSRTs, “discussions on a wide variety of detainee procedures
continue within interagency circles.” William Glaberson, U.S. Mulls New
Status Hearings for Guantanamo Inmates, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A16.
All the while, members of Congress have attempted to undo the damaging
legislation passed in previous Congresses—numerous bills have been introduced
that would repeal the court-stripping provisions passed in 2005 and 2006 and
restore habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees. See infra note 243 and
accompanying text.
180
The government has contended that detainees, “enjoy more procedural
protections than any other captured enemy combatants in the history of warfare.”
Brief for the Boumediene Respondents, supra note 130, at 9.
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remain in custody at Guantanamo.181 The military has suggested
that the failure to release some cleared detainees lies in the refusal
of the detainees’ home countries to accept them back or guarantee
that they will not be tortured or mistreated upon their return.182
However, military officials have also acknowledged that the
Pentagon retains the ultimate authority to continue holding a
detainee regardless of a CSRT determination that a detainee should
be released from custody. 183 In practice, this means that the
Pentagon may order new CSRTs for detainees who are initially
recommended for release, thereby allowing the government to
continue holding detainees at Guantanamo.184 The Pentagon’s
authority to continue detainment despite a CSRT determination in
favor of release questions the legitimacy of the entire CSRT
process.185
i. Military Officials Condemn the CSRT Process
Sworn statements by two military officials involved in CSRTs
further reinforce the conclusion that the process is fatally
flawed.186 Both officers have filed declarations in federal court to
181

“At least eight prisoners at Guantanamo are there even though they are
no longer designated as enemy combatants.” Hegland, supra note 156. See also
Farah Stockman, Some Cleared Guantanamo Inmates Stay in Custody—
Lawyers call U.S. System of Hearings a Sham, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19,
2007, at 1A.
182
Id. In regard to the transfer of detainees to their home countries, a
Pentagon spokesman said, “many countries are just not moving very quickly.”
William Glaberson, Hurdles Frustrate Effort to Shrink Guantanamo, N.Y.
T IMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at A1.
183
Stockman, supra note 181. In addition to determinations made at
Guantanamo, case-by-case reviews are also conducted in Washington. In
determining whether to authorize release of a detainee, officials consider factors
such as new evidence, any danger potentially posed by a detainee, and the
willingness of a detainee’s home country to ensure that he will not pose a threat
to the United States in the future. Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Mark Jacobson, an assistant for detainee policy under Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld from November 2002 through August 2003, said in
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support detainees’ contentions that the CSRT process is unfair and
inadequate.187 One statement, filed in the Supreme Court by Army
Reserve Lt. Col. Stephen A. Abraham,188 was so revealing and
critical of CSRTs that some believe it contributed to the Court’s
decision to grant certiorari in Boumediene v. Bush.189
Similarly, statements by an unnamed Army Reserve Major190
collected during an investigation by the Oregon Federal Public
Defender’s Office in the case of a Sudanese national detained at

an interview with The National Journal, “I think the standards for sending
someone to Guantanamo in 2002 and early 2003 were not as high as they
should have been.” Hegland, supra note 156; see also Lyle Denniston, A New
Critique of Pentagon Detainee Panels, SCOTUSblog.com, Oct. 5, 2007,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/a-new-critique-of-pentagondetainee-panels/ [hereinafter A New Critique].
187
See Lyle Denniston, Abraham Takes on Top Security Echelon,
SCOTUSblog.com, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/
uncategorized/abraham-takes-on-top-security-echelon/ [hereinafter Abraham Takes
on Top Security Echelon]; see also A New Critique, supra note 186.
188
Lt. Col. Abraham, a California attorney at the law firm of Fink &
Abraham and a Reservist in the United States Army, was assigned to the Office
for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
(“OARDEC”) in September 2004. Declaration of Reserve Lt. Col. Stephen A.
Abraham at 2, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2007/11/sub-new-abraham-declaration.pdf [hereinafter Abraham Declaration].
OARDEC was charged with testing “the validity of prior summary
pronouncements that the detainees at Guantanamo had been properly classified as
Enemy Combatants. OARDEC rules authorized the collection of relevant
information prior to the empanelling of a [CSRT].” Id.
189
See A New Critique, supra note 186. In a second statement filed in the
D.C. Circuit Court in another detainee case, Hamad v. Gates, No. 07-1098
(D.C. Cir. 2007), Lt. Col. Abraham charged that, “there was no systematic
method for requesting the government information relating to specific detainees”
and that, “the individuals collecting, reviewing, and processing the information
to be used by the [CSRTs] appeared to have little experience with intelligence
products.” Abraham Declaration, supra note 188.
190
The officer’s name was redacted from the publicly available declaration
and withheld from reports. According to his sworn declaration, he sat on fortynine CSRT panels in Guantanamo. Declaration of William J. Teesdale, Esq.,
Hamad v. Bush, No. 05-1009 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Teesdale
Declaration].
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Guantanamo also provided sharp criticism of the process.191 In his
declaration, the anonymous military official stated that he
witnessed several major problems involving evidence and
procedure.192 First, no exculpatory evidence was ever formally
presented in any CSRT he attended, although he did acknowledge
that panels sometimes inadvertently discovered exculpatory
evidence as a result of investigating inconsistencies in the record.193
Second, the role and responsibilities of the Recorder seemed to
differ in each hearing.194 Third, he witnessed officers involved in
the proceedings express legitimate concern that CSRT panel
members “did not understand the distinction between conclusory
statements and actual evidence.”195 Moreover, he stated that in six
of the forty-nine CSRT hearings in which he participated, the panel
came to a unanimous decision that the detainee was not an enemy
combatant, but he observed that in each case, the Pentagon directed
that a new CSRT panel be convened.196
ii. Political Influences on the CSRT Process
The government’s CSRT policy has not been untouched by
politics. Documents released by the Pentagon in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request 197 reveal that CSRTs have
resulted in “inconsistent decisions to release men declared by the
Bush administration to be among America’s most-hardened
enemies . . . rais[ing] questions about whether [the decisions] were
arbitrary.”198 The October 2007 resignation of the lead prosecutor
for terrorism trials at Guantanamo, Air Force Col. Morris Davis,
191

See A New Critique, supra note 186.
See generally Teesdale Declaration, supra note 190.
193
Id. at 6.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 7.
196
Id. at 8.
197
The Freedom of Information Act request was initiated by the Associated
Press. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38.
198
Andrew O. Selsky, Files Raise Questions About Gitmo, Decisions to
Release Detainees Appear to Be Inconsistent, Documents Show, ORLANDO
SENTINEL , Oct. 3, 2007, at A6.
192
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also illustrates the force of politics. Col. Davis resigned after he
charged that, “politically motivated officials at the Pentagon
pushed for [the] conviction of high-profile detainees [in formal
military commissions] before the 2008 election.”199 In discussing
his abrupt resignation, Col. Davis cited his concerns about the use
of classified evidence in CSRTs and the propensity of supposedly
neutral legal advisors to interfere with prosecutorial functions. 200
iii. The Administration’s Suggested Alternatives
Aware of the criticisms of and challenges to the CSRT system,
the Administration recently indicated that it is considering
alternatives.201 One of the options being contemplated would allow
the government to convene new CSRTs for detainees currently
remaining at Guantanamo.202 Another alternative proposed by the
White House would involve granting detainees “substantially
greater rights [than they currently have] as part of an effort to close
the detention center” and relocate detainees to prisons in the
United States.203 This may involve providing detainees counsel and
giving final status determination authority to federal judges rather
than military officers. 204 Though certainly an improvement on the
current process, these proposed alternatives are not an
acknowledgement by the current Administration that the current
CSRT procedures are flawed. Rather, the Administration maintains
that they are only an attempt to assess the practicality of closing
the detention center at Guantanamo.205

199

Josh White, Ex-Official: Push on Terror Cases Politically Motivated,
W ASH . POST, Oct. 21, 2007.
200
Id.
201
William Glaberson, New Detainee Rights Weighed in Plans to Close
Guantanamo, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at A1.
202
Lyle Denniston, Government Considers Re-Doing Detainee Cases,
SCOTUSblog.com,
Oct.
12,
2007,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/
uncategorized/government-considers-re-doing-detainee-cases.
203
Glaberson, supra note 201.
204
Id.
205
Id.
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B. The Courts
i. Bismullah v. Gates and the Fight Over the Scope of the
Record on Review

Petitioners in Bismullah were detained at Guantanamo,
designated by separate CSRTs as enemy combatants, and
subsequently filed petitions for review of their enemy combatant
status designations in the D.C. Circuit.206 During review before the
D.C. Circuit, the parties disagreed over the breadth of the
protective order originally issued in 2005 that dictated the scope of
the record on review as well as how to handle sensitive information
and interaction between detainees and their counsel.207 The
government argued that the record before the D.C. Circuit when
conducting its review of a CSRT should be limited to that compiled
by the Recorder, and that the government should only be required
to turn over to petitioners’ counsel the information presented to

206

Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Bismullah v. Gates was
consolidated from two separate cases—Bismullah v. Gates and Parhat v. Gates.
Petitioner Bismullah was captured in Afghanistan in 2003 and determined by a
CSRT to be an enemy combatant on November 30, 2004. The seven petitioners
in Parhat were captured in Pakistan in December 2001 and each was determined
by a separate CSRT to be an enemy combatant. Because both cases were filed
under the DTA and ostensibly dealt with the same issue, the D.C. Circuit
ordered them to be argued on the same day and consolidated both cases.
207
The Green Protective Order governed a detainee’s access to counsel and
information from 2004 until it was challenged in Bismullah I. See supra notes
41, 45. The old protective order provided some protections for letters written
between counsel and a detainee that were related to counsel’s representation of
the detainee, as well as protections for privileged documents and publicly-filed
legal documents relating to that representation; a presumption that detainees’
counsel have a “need to know” information in their own cases and in related
cases; and revised procedures for in-person counsel visits at Guantanamo. See In
re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004). Though
the Green Protective Order provided some guarantees for detainees, it was
severely limited in scope and significantly impaired the D.C. Circuit Court’s
ability to conduct any kind of meaningful review. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d
178.
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the CSRT.208 By contrast, petitioners argued that the reviewing
court should have access to all evidence and information
“reasonably available to the government,” including information
that may have not been presented to the CSRT panel.209
The D.C. Circuit Court agreed with detainees that the record on
review should consist of the entire body of information collected
by the government and not merely that which was compiled by the
Recorder and presented to the CSRT panel.210 The court explained
that such a limitation on courts’ access to evidence would severely
inhibit meaningful judicial review, and the court subsequently
ordered the government to turn over the relevant documents.211
The government did not readily acquiesce to the court’s order.
Rather than turn over the entire body of information relevant to
each detainee, the government requested a panel rehearing, arguing
that it could not meet the burden of production imposed by the
court’s decision.212 While the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately denied
the government’s petition for a panel rehearing, it expressly
presented the government with the option of convening new
CSRTs rather than attempting to compile all of the relevant
information in the government’s possession at the time of each
detainee’s original CSRT.213 While this alternative would still
require the government to compile information regarding a detainee,
DOD regulations only require the compilation of information that
is reasonably available at the time the CSRT is convened.214 The
government argued that this standard still imposed too heavy a
burden and petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc. The court,
in an even 5-5 split, denied the government’s motion on February
1, 2008.215
Not yet willing to concede, the government asked the D.C.
208

Bismullah I, 501 F.3d at 185.
Id. at 184.
210
Id. at 185–86.
211
Id.
212
Bismullah v. Gates (Bismullah II), 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3,
2007), amending Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2007).
213
Bismullah II, 503 F.3d at 141.
214
Id.
215
Bismullah III, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 1, 2008).
209
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Circuit Court to stay its July 2007 order, applicable not only to
the petitioners in Bismullah I but to all the 180 detainee petitions
now pending before it, thus giving the government time to challenge
that decision in the Supreme Court.216 The Circuit Court duly
granted the stay—though it applied only to the petitioners in
Bismullah I—and on February 14, 2007 the government petitioned
the Supreme Court to hold the case until after its disposition of
another detainee case already pending there, or in the alternative, to
grant review and set it on an expedited schedule so that it may be
decided this term.217 In its petition to the Supreme Court, the
government argued that the Circuit Court’s July 2007 order
expanding the scope of the record on review is “unprecedented in
any administrative or judicial context” and would require the
government “to divert a significant portion of its intelligence, law
enforcement, and military resources to either creating new ‘records’
for DTA litigation or to conducting entirely new CSRT hearings for
those detainees.”218 Detainees’ reply brief urged the court to deny
the government’s appeal, but agreed that, should the Court decide
to hear the case, it should do so on an expedited schedule.219
Though the Supreme Court was expected to consider the appeal at
its private conference on March 14, 2008,220 no action has yet been
taken.
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ii. Boumediene v. Bush, Al-Odah v. United States and the Fight
Over the Constitutionality of Court-Stripping
While the parties in Bismullah continue to disagree over the
scope of the D.C. Circuit’s review of CSRT procedures under the
DTA and MCA, petitioners in the companion cases Boumediene v.
Bush and Al-Odah v. United States are awaiting the Supreme
Court’s ruling in their own action, wherein they challenged the
constitutionality of the court-stripping provision itself.221 After
the D.C. Circuit Court ordered that petitioner detainees’ habeas
petitions be dismissed in February 2007,222 they filed petitions for
writs of certiorari in the Supreme Court.223 The Supreme Court
initially denied petitioners’ request,224 but in a rare and unexpected
move, the Court reversed itself on the last day of the term several
months later and granted detainees’ petition for certiorari and
rehearing.225
After years of navigating the federal appellate court system,226
221

Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States (U.S.
argued Dec. 5, 2007).
222
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C.
Circuit agreed that detainees had no independent right to seek writs of habeas
corpus in federal court under the MCA; rather, the court held detainees have only
the right to a review of their CSRT determinations pursuant to the DTA. See
generally id. Judge Rogers dissented from the majority opinion and maintained
that the court-stripping provision of the MCA is an unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus and that, “[Congress’] attempt to revoke federal
jurisdiction that the Supreme Court held to exist exceeds the powers of
Congress.” Id. at 1007 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
223
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195
(Mar. 5, 2007).
224
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (Apr. 2, 2007) (denying cert.);
see also Joan Biskupic, Court to Decide Detainees’ Rights, Justices Try to
Balance Protection of Nation, Protection of Individual, USA T ODAY , Nov. 27,
2007, at 7A. Justices Stevens and Kennedy acknowledged the importance of the
issue presented and signaled their intent to consider developments in other
pending detainee cases, namely Bismullah, as to the efficacy of the CSRT review
process. Id.
225
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29, 2007), vacating 127
S. Ct. 1478 (April 2, 2007).
226
Petitioners in Boumediene have been litigating their asserted rights to
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detainees finally had the opportunity to present their argument to
the Supreme Court on December 5, 2007. Petitioner detainees
stressed the inadequacies of the CSRT process, arguing that the
constitutional writ of habeas corpus extends to non-citizen
detainees held at Guantanamo and thus that the court-stripping
provision of the MCA is an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ.227 Petitioners went on to contend that while suspending
habeas rights is a valid exercise of Congress’ authority if it provides
an “adequate and effective alternative,”228 the CSRT process does
not meet this standard.229
In response, the government first argued that the constitutional
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to non-citizens captured and
detained abroad, and, alternatively, that Guantanamo detainees
“enjoy more procedural protections than any other captured
enemy combatants in the history of warfare.”230 The government
maintained that detainees were provided an “adequate and effective
alternative” for habeas in the form of the CSRT and D.C. Circuit
Court review processes, 231 and the Court should therefore exercise
restraint and refrain from overruling long-respected precedent. 232
In light of the D.C. Circuit’s disposition in Bismullah, the
petitioners in Boumediene and Al-Odah filed supplemental briefing
with the Supreme Court after the oral argument on December 5,
2007. In an attempt to buttress their constitutional challenge,
petitioners cited Bismullah in support of their contention that the
procedures set up by Congress to challenge CSRTs under the DTA

file habeas petitions in federal court since 2005. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
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See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 9–15, Boumediene v. Bush,
No. 06-1195 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2007).
228
See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (holding that where a
collateral remedy is adequate and effective to test the legality of one’s detention,
such a substitution is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus).
229
Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 227, at 18–32.
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See Brief for Boumediene Respondents, supra note 130.
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are clearly ineffective.233 Because the Supreme Court had signaled
that its decision in Boumediene and Al-Odah “might be affected at
least in part by what the Circuit Court [does] in Bismullah,”234
detainees seized the opportunity to reinforce the arguments they
made before the Court in early December.
In the first of two supplemental briefs, detainees argued that
the D.C. Circuit’s decision to deny the government’s motion for a
rehearing en banc “does nothing to alleviate the fundamental
structural inadequacies of the DTA review process as a substitute
for habeas, and will only result in more delay.”235 In its second
brief, filed just days later, detainees further argued that
[t]he fractured nature of the D.C. Circuit’s recent action
does not bode well for the future of DTA proceedings.
There is ample reason to believe that the D.C. Circuit will
continue to engage in divided, incremental decisionmaking
on threshold procedural issues on which Congress has
provided no guidance, thus making DTA review far less
speedy than the centuries-old remedy of habeas.236
Indeed, both briefs attempted to further emphasize the fact that the
D.C. Circuit Court’s disposition in Bismullah would not resolve
the overarching question of detainees’ rights.
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Even if the Supreme Court takes the opportunity in
Boumediene and Al-Odah to hold the court-stripping provision of
the MCA unconstitutional, there is still the possibility that
Congress may attempt to circumvent the ruling as it did in the
wake of both Rasul and Hamdan.237 While some members of
Congress have recognized that, “the elimination of basic legal rights
undermines, not strengthens, [the] ability to achieve justice,”238 a
vocal segment of Congress ardently maintains that habeas corpus
does not, and indeed should not, extend to alien enemies captured
and detained abroad in wartime.239
Nonetheless, there is still the possibility for change: Senators
Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Chairman and Ranking Member
of the Senate Judiciary Committee respectively, have repeatedly
criticized Congress’ failure to repeal the court-stripping provision
of the MCA, calling it “a historic error in judgment”240 and an
attempt to “set back basic rights by some 900 years.”241 Moreover,
several measures have been introduced in the House and the Senate
that would have repealed the section of the MCA that stripped
federal courts of their jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions
and restored detainees’ right to habeas corpus. 242 Unfortunately,
237
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however, no measures have yet garnered enough support to pass
through a House committee or overcome a Senate filibuster.243
CONCLUSION
Detainees at Guantanamo have only one form of procedural due
process, and it is minimal at best: the D.C. Circuit Court can only
review whether the CSRT in the detainee’s case complied with its
own procedures.244 In order to preserve the legitimacy of American
constitutional values and ensure the legitimacy of the CSRT
system, detainees must be afforded basic procedural guarantees and
a fair adversarial process during their initial CSRTs.245 The Framers
of the Constitution recognized liberty as a preexisting natural right,
and sought to protect it in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.246 Recognition of Guantanamo detainees’ right to liberty
might seem counterintuitive in the context of protecting the nation
Cong. (as reported by the Senate June 26, 2007); Habeas Corpus Preservation
Act, H.R. 1189, 110th Cong. (2007); Military Commissions Habeas Corpus
Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 267, 110th Cong. (2007); Military Commissions
Revisions Act of 2007, H.R. 2543, 110th Cong. (2007); Restoring the
Constitution Act of 2007, H.R. 1415, 110th Cong. (2007); Restoring the
Constitution Act of 2007, S. 576 (2007); Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of
2006, S. 4081, 109th Cong. (2006).
243
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from the threat of terrorism, but this does not serve as a
justification for ignoring the right altogether. Rather, “[t]he concept
that . . . constitutional protections against arbitrary government are
inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and . . . would
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the
basis of our Government.”247
The United States Constitution provides explicit procedural
guarantees to protect against certain kinds of government action.
However, those guarantees are more than just procedural
protections. Provisions like the Fifth Amendment, which provides
that, “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law,”248 stands for the proposition that we,
as Americans, will not stand for or be party to abusive and
arbitrary government encroachment on the right to liberty.
Importantly, recognizing detainees’ liberty rights does not require
that detainees be released or even that detainees be afforded the
gamut of constitutional protections. The preservation of liberty
merely requires that the process afforded to detainees maintain a
basic adversarial structure and conform to traditional constitutional
values. Rather than weaken the argument for providing detainees a
more legitimate process for challenging their detention, the
government’s interest in securing the nation against the threat of
terrorism without sacrificing the constitutional principles that
underlie our system of government highlights the need for adequate
constitutional protection for detainees.
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